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Lessons learned from the Triangle Waist factory 
fire 
BY PETER DREIER AND DONALD COHEN 
 
 
 
Some of the 146 victims of the Triangle Waist Company factory fire lay on the 
streets of New York’s Lower East Side, March 25, 1911. Photo: International Ladies’ 
Garment Workers’ Union 
For a listing of Triangle Waist factory fire centennial commemoration 
events around Los Angeles visit jewishjournal.com/calendar_stories. 
On March 25, 1911, 146 garment workers, mostly Jewish and Italian 
immigrant girls in their teens and 20s, perished after a fire broke out at the 
Triangle Waist Co. factory in New York City’s Greenwich Village. Even after 
the fire, the city’s businesses continued to insist they could regulate 
themselves, but the deaths clearly demonstrated that companies like 
Triangle would not, on their own, concern themselves with their workers’ 
safety. Despite this business opposition, the public’s response to the fire led 
to landmark state regulations.   
The fire was a milestone in Jewish, labor and women’s history, and 
Americans are now observing the tragedy’s 100th anniversary. Last month, 
PBS broadcast a new documentary about the fire, and HBO will air its own 
version next week. In Los Angeles and elsewhere, academics, unions and 
Jewish organizations have organized conferences, plays and memorial 
ceremonies. Publishers have recently issued several histories, a novel and a 
volume of poetry about Triangle.   
The themes are similar: We should remember those who perished and know 
that their deaths were not in vain. The tragedy was the catalyst for a century 
of reforms that made our jobs safer and families more secure.  
But the fire also offers valuable lessons that resonate with contemporary 
political battles. Businesses today, and their allies in Congress and the state 
houses, are making the same arguments against government regulation that 
New York’s business leaders made a century ago. The current hue and cry 
about “burdensome government regulations” and unions that stifle job 
growth shows that the Triangle fire’s lessons may have been forgotten. Here 
is what happened. 
One hundred years ago, New York was a city of enormous wealth and wide 
disparities between rich and poor. New industries, including the clothing 
industry, were booming. The new age had created a demand for off-the-rack, 
mass-produced clothing sold in department stores. The Triangle company 
made blouses, called shirtwaists.  
Few consumers who bought the ready-to-wear clothing gave much thought 
to the people who made it. The garments were sewn in miserable factories, 
often by teenage girls who worked seven days a week, from 7 a.m. to 8 p.m. 
and longer during the busy season. They were paid about $6 per week, and 
often were required to use their own needles, thread, irons and even sewing 
machines. The overcrowded factories (often a room in a tenement 
apartment) lacked ventilation; many were poorly lit firetraps without 
sprinklers or fire escapes. 
In November 1909, 20,000 shirtwaist makers from more than 500 
factories walked off their jobs. They demanded a 20 percent pay raise, a 52-
hour workweek, extra pay for overtime, adequate fire escapes and open 
doors from the factories to the street.  Their union, the International Ladies 
Garment Workers Union (ILGWU), held meetings in English, Yiddish and 
Italian. The police began arresting strikers — labeling some of them “street 
walkers,” which was literally true, as they were carrying picket signs up and 
down the sidewalks. Judges fined them and sentenced some of the activists 
to labor camps. 
But the strikers held out, and by February 1910, most of the small and 
midsize factories, and some larger employers, had negotiated a settlement 
for higher pay and shorter hours. One of the companies that refused to settle 
was the Triangle Waist Co., one of the largest garment makers. 
That July, more than 60,000 cloak makers, mostly men, went on strike. As 
the strike escalated, union and business leaders invited prominent Boston 
attorney Louis Brandeis to New York to mediate the conflict. Brandeis (later a 
Supreme Court justice and leader of American Zionism) plunged into a 
crusade to bring industrial democracy to New York’s clothing industry. 
Operating as a neutral mediator, and without pay, Brandeis brought the 
manufacturers (through their trade association) and the workers (through 
the ILGWU) — both led by Jews — together to hammer out an industry-wide 
agreement that would make strikes less likely. With Brandeis’ nudging, the 
two sides signed the Protocol of Peace agreement that set minimum industry 
standards on wages, hours, piece rates and workplace safety. Under the 
agreement, manufacturers were to give preference to union workers. Both 
sides agreed to take disputes to a three-member board of arbitration. 
The protocol laid the foundation for future workplace reforms during the New 
Deal. But the protocol’s weakness was that it was a voluntary agreement, not 
a government regulation, and not all manufacturers signed on. Once again, 
one of the holdouts was the Triangle Waist Co. 
The company was owned by Isaac Harris and Max Blanck, both up-from-the-
sweatshop Jewish immigrants, known as the “the shirtwaist kings.” They 
were rabidly anti-union.  
On Saturday, March 25, 1911, at 4:45 p.m., near quitting time, a fire broke 
out on the building’s eighth and ninth floors. Factory foremen had locked the 
exit doors to keep union organizers out and keep workers from taking breaks 
and stealing scraps of fabric. Other doors only opened inward and were 
blocked by the stampede of workers struggling to escape. The ladders of the 
city’s fire engines could not reach high enough to save the employees. As a 
result, workers burned or jumped to their deaths. Experts later concluded 
that the fire likely was caused by a cigarette dropped on a pile of “cut-
aways,” or scraps of cloths, that had been accumulating for almost three 
months. 
Out of that cauldron of misery and protest emerged a diverse progressive 
movement composed of unlikely allies. It included immigrants, unionists, 
muckraking journalists, clergy, middle-class reformers like Frances Perkins 
(then a Consumers League activist who would become Franklin D. 
Roosevelt’s trailblazing secretary of labor), socialists and socialites, including 
Anne Morgan (daughter of Wall Street chieftain J.P. Morgan).  
On April 6, 30,000 New Yorkers marched — and hundreds of thousands more 
lined the march’s route — to memorialize the fire’s victims. Numerous rallies 
and editorials called for reforms — not only for fire safety codes but also 
workplace safety standards, child labor standards, shorter work hours, 
minimum wages and limits in home work.   
Within days of the fire, groups organized mass meetings to demand reform. 
Rabbi Stephen S. Wise, one of the featured speakers at a rally at the 
Metropolitan Opera House, did not mince words.  
“It is not the action of God but the inaction of man that is responsible,” he 
thundered. “The disaster was not the deed of God (a natural disaster) but the 
greed of man (systematic).”  
Wise did not seek charity.  He demanded justice.   
“We have laws that in a crisis we find are no laws, and we have enforcement 
that, when the hour of trial comes, we find is no enforcement. Let us lift up 
the industrial standards until they will bear inspection. And when we go 
before the legislatures, let us not allow them to put us off forever with the 
old answer, ‘We have no money.’ If we have no money for necessary 
enforcement of laws which safeguard the lives of workers, it is because so 
much of our money is wasted and squandered and stolen.” 
Then Rose Schneiderman — a Jewish immigrant, sweatshop worker, union 
organizer and socialist — rose to speak. She echoed Wise’s sentiments, but 
went further. Having seen the police and the courts side with the garment 
manufacturers against the workers, and politicians in the pockets of business 
community, she questioned whether better laws would make a difference if 
they weren’t enforced. 
“I would be a traitor to these poor burned bodies if I came here to talk good 
fellowship. We have tried you good people of the public, and we have found 
you wanting,” Schneiderman said. “This is not the first time girls have been 
burned alive in the city. Every week I must learn of the untimely death of 
one of my sister workers. Every year thousands of us are maimed. The life of 
men and women is so cheap, and poverty is so sacred. There are so many of 
us for one job, it matters little if 146 of us are burned to death. … I can’t talk 
fellowship to you who are gathered here. Too much blood has been spilled. I 
know from my experience it is up to the working people to save themselves. 
The only way they can save themselves is by a strong working-class 
movement.” 
Public outrage led New York Gov. John Alden Dix to create the Factory 
Investigating Commission, with broad subpoena powers and teams of 
investigators, led by two savvy politicians, state Assemblyman Al Smith and 
state Sen. Robert Wagner. Over two years, commission members traveled up 
and down the state, holding hearings, visiting more than 3,000 factories in 
20 industries and interviewing almost 500 witnesses. They found buildings 
without fire escapes, bakeries in poorly ventilated cellars with rat droppings 
(only 21 percent even had bathrooms, most of them unsanitary), children — 
some as young as 5 years old — working in canning factories and women 
working 18-hour days. 
After the fire, many officials acknowledged there was a problem.  Edward F. 
Croker, New York City’s retired fire chief, told the commission that employers 
“pay absolutely no attention to the fire hazard or to the protection of the 
employees in these buildings. That is their last consideration.” His 
department had cited the Triangle building for lack of fire escapes a week 
before the fire.  
But the garment manufacturers, and the real estate, bakery and cannery 
industry groups, sought to stymie the commission. After the fire department 
ordered warehouses to install sprinklers, the Protective League of Property 
Owners denounced the mandate, angrily charging the city with forcing 
owners to use “cumbersome and costly” equipment.  
A representative of the Associated Industries of New York insisted that 
regulations would mean “the wiping out of industry in this state.” Mabel Clark 
of the W.N. Clark Co., a canning corporation, opposed any restrictions on 
child labor. “I have seen children working in factories, and I have seen them 
working at home, and they were perfectly happy,” she declared. 
Terence McGuire, president of the Real Estate Board, summed up the 
business argument against regulation. “To my mind this is all wrong,” he 
declared. “The experience of the past proves conclusively that the best 
government is the least possible government.” The board warned that new 
laws would drive “manufacturers out of the City and State of New York.” 
Fortunately, Smith, Wagner and other political leaders, fortified by a vibrant 
progressive movement, ignored these opponents of business regulation. In 
the first year, the commission proposed, and the legislature quickly passed, 
laws requiring mandatory fire drills, automatic sprinklers and unlocked doors 
during work hours. They also created rules on the storage and disposal of 
flammable waste, and they banned smoking from shop floors. 
The next year, the legislature passed additional reforms. It set maximum 
numbers of workers per floor and established codes requiring new buildings 
to include fireproof stairways and fire escapes. It required employers to 
provide clean drinking water, washrooms and toilets for their employees. It 
gave labor commission inspectors the power to shut down unsanitary 
tenement sweatshops. And it ruled that women could work no more than 54 
hours a week and that children younger than 18 could not work in dangerous 
situations. 
These path-breaking state regulations, provoked by the Triangle fire, proved 
that government could play a powerful role in the lives of ordinary people. 
Other states followed suit, and, ultimately, Roosevelt, prodded by Perkins, 
Wagner and other veterans of New York’s progressive movement, introduced 
New Deal reforms ending child labor, establishing a federal minimum wage 
and a 40-hour work week, and creating a National Labor Relations Board 
giving workers the right to unionize and bargain collectively with employers.  
The Triangle company’s owners were tried for manslaughter but were found 
innocent when the judge told the jury that to return a guilty verdict, they had 
to find that the two defendants knew or should have known that the doors 
were locked. But the company never recovered from the fire and the 
controversy.  In 1918, it closed its doors.   
That didn’t happen to other city businesses. Contrary to the business leaders’ 
dire predictions, they did not suffer from the new regulations. The New York 
Times reported in July 1914, “Notwithstanding all the talk of a probable 
exodus of manufacturing interests, the commission has not found a single 
case of a manufacturer intending to leave the State because of the 
enforcement of the factory laws.” New York’s Seventh Avenue remained the 
headquarters of the nation’s garment industry for decades, until production 
gradually moved south and overseas after World War II. 
Ironically, 100 years after the Triangle fire, we still hear much of the same 
rhetoric whenever reformers seek to use government to make businesses act 
more responsibly and protect consumers, workers and the environment. For 
example, the disasters last year that killed 29 miners in West Virginia and 11 
oil rig workers in the Gulf of Mexico could have been avoided had lawmakers 
resisted lobbying by mine owners and oil-well owner BP to weaken safety 
regulations.   
Today, the leading foe of reform is the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, which is 
on a crusade against the Obama administration’s plans to set new rules on 
unsafe workplaces, industrial hazards and threats to public health. The 
Chamber labels every reform effort a “job killer.” Its most vocal ally in 
Congress is Darrell Issa, the California Republican who chairs the House 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. At the request of the 
Chamber and other industry lobbies, Issa recently launched a Congressional 
assault on safeguards in workplaces and communities.  
In January, Issa sent letters to more than 170 companies and business lobby 
groups — including those representing the energy, auto, oil, chemical, health 
care, banking and telecommunication industries — asking them to identify 
“burdensome government regulations” that they want eliminated. 
The business groups responded with a long wish list, including rules to 
control “combustible dust” that has resulted in explosions killing workers; 
rules to track musculoskeletal disorders such as tendinitis, carpal tunnel 
syndrome or back injuries that impact millions of workers at keyboards, in 
construction or in meat processing; and rules to address workplace noise that 
leads to hearing loss. And Republicans listened. They are proposing to cut 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s budget by 20 percent, 
which, coming on top of decades of cuts, would cripple an agency that has 
been effective at significantly reducing workplace injuries and deaths.   
If the Triangle fire occurred today, the Chamber would surely call mandatory 
sprinklers and fire escapes “job killing” regulations. It would call for 
“voluntary solutions” to sweatshops and firetraps, and ask to get government 
off the backs of private employers.   
The Republican message, in House Speaker John Boehner’s words, is that 
“excessive regulation costs jobs” and that the “path to prosperity” is by 
“getting government out of the way.” Americans of earlier generations — 
who enjoyed the benefits of the Progressive Era and the New Deal reforms, 
and the political clout of a vibrant labor movement — understood this was 
nonsense, but it seems like these lessons have to be relearned. That’s why it 
is important to recall the sordid circumstances in which 146 young women 
lost their lives at the Triangle Waist Co. a century ago.  
 
On March 25, 1911, a fire started in the Triangle Waist Company in the Asch Building 
near Washington Square. In the end, the death toll was 146. 
http://www.jewishjournal.com/opinion/article/lessons_learned_from_the_tria
ngle_waist_factory_fire_20110315/ 
 
